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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
---------~-----~-------~----------------------------------------
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
BERT LEON HANSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. . . 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 17078 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah 
against the defendant/appellant Bert Leon Hanson, alleging that 
defendant/appellant did recklessly cause the death of another, 
Camie Lee Hanson, in violation of Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, 
§76-5-205, a felony of the second degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOvIBR COURT 
Defendant/appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of 
manslaughter and was sentenced by the court to be confined in 
the Utah State Prison for an undetermined term of not less than 
one year nor more than fifteen years. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant/appellant seeks that he be placed 
on probation or that he be permitted to withdraw his 
plea of guilty and that his case be remanded for trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The present case evolves from the death of 
the infant daughter of defendant/appellant on September 4, 
1979 in Roosevelt, Duchesne County, Utah. Defendant was 
charged with murder in the second degree, a felony of 
the first degree. In a preliminary hearing held October 18, 
1979, in the Circuit Court, Seventh District, Duchesne 
County, the Honorable Kenneth G. Anderton found sufficient 
cause to bind the matter over to the Fourth Judicial 
District Court for further proceedings on November 13, 1979. 
On November 5, 1979, defendant was admitted to 
the psychiatric unit of St. Marks Hospital in Salt Lake 
City for treatment of severe depression. Arraignment was 
continued to December 10, 1979, because defendant was 
still hospitalized on November 13, 1979. 
Defendant notified the District Court, pursuant to 
s 
s77-24-17, Utah Code Ann. (1953) on November 26, of his intent-
ion to rely on an insanity defense. Having been released from 
St. Marks, defendant pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of 
-2-
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insanity at the December 10 arrai·gnment hearing. Judge 
David Sam ordered psychiatric examinations by two alienists 
and set a jury trial for February 7, 1980. 
Prior to the rescheduled trial date of March 5, 
1980, defendant, through counsel, and in reliance upon the 
reports of the court appointed alienists and his own medical 
evidence, entered into plea bargainin9 with the prosecution. 
Consequently an amended information charging defendant with 
manslaughter, a felony of the second decree, was filed with 
the court. Foregoing his criminal culpability defense, 
defendant pleaded guilty to the reduced charges in belief 
credence would be given the medical reports. The expert 
opinions of examining alienists, along with the agreed 
abstinence of the prosecuting attorney on sentence, that 
defendant continue to receive treatment and not be incarcerated 
were noted at this time in open court. The court did state 
that it was not bound by the recommendations of doctors, 
the county attorney, or the Adult Probation and Parole 
Department. Sentencing was continued until April 11, 1980 
to allow the Parole Department time to assess defendant's 
background and prepare a pre-sentence report. 
The investigation by the Department resulted in a 
guideline recommendation of probation. However, after a 
hearing known as "paneling", the Department overruled the 
recommendation and recommended incarceration without comment 
or reasoning. 
Having been advised by the court before sentencing that 
-3-
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incarceration of defendant was inuninent, counsel moved in court 
for a continuance of one week within which to file an affidavit 
against Judge Sam proceeding in the case. Such motion was 
denied. Counsel then made a motion to allow the withdrawal of 
the guilty plea to allow trial on the original charge. Such 
motion was also denied. After a stay of execution to allow time 
to file a certificate of probable cause, defendant was committed 
to the Utah State Pris·on for an indeterminate term of from one 
to fifteen years, where he is now detained. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ABUSING 
ITS DISCRETION BY NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO WITH-
DRAW. HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
This appeal poses the problem of whether the trial judge 
\ 
abused his discretion in not permitting defendant, prior to irn-
pos.i tion of sentence, to withdraw his guilty plea which was made 
pursuant to a plea bargain. Although it is well established in 
Utah that §77-24-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953) (the statute controlling 
withdrawal of guilty pleas at the time of the trial) does not 
grant an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, but merely gives 
the court discretionary power, it is just as well established that 
the appellate court will interfere when the lower court has abused 
its discretion. At the outset it should be made clear that 
appellant does not request that this policy be changed, so that 
-4-
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in the future courts, would grant automatic approval to all 
those wishing to retract their pleas. Appellant merely urges 
that this is just such an instance where the manifest injustice 
perpetrated compels this Court to declare the right of petitioner 
to withdraw his plea. 
A. THE PLEA BARGAINING SYSTEM 
Defendant's plea of guilty to the reduced charge was a 
result of plea bargaining with the prosecution. Before consider-
ing the abuse in this particular instance, an understanding of 
the role of plea bargaining in the criminal justice system is 
necessary, as well as the rights of a defendant who has pleaded 
guilty under a plea bargain and not received the concessions 
anticipated under the bargain. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the 
efficacy of plea bargaining. "[P] lea bargaining is an essential 
component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, 
it is to be encouraged." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 
(1971) . It is impossible to see how the system is encouraged 
by denying both the defendant's anticipated penalty or the right 
to withdraw his plea. In discussing Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, the Columbia Law Review takes note that 
the "basic recognition that a defendant should be able to rely 
on the authority of bargaining prosecutors seems sensible in 
context of todays criminal justice sys·tern." 76 Colum. L. Rev. 
1072 (1976); accord: Jord'an v. Commonwealth, 225 S.E.2d 661, 
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664 (Va. 1976}. "Rule 11 now permits a defendant to withdraw 
his guilty plea whenever a judge decides not to impose the 
sentence upon which. the prosecutor and the defendant have 
agreee." Id, 1070. 
This recognitition in the federal system of the right 
to withdraw a plea, as well as in several state jurisdictions, 
reflects the need of maintaining the integrity of the system in 
the accused's perception of plea bargaining. The policy reason 
of keeping dockets clear applies to the state court system 
as well as the federal. Expediency is a major basis for the 
present system. Estimates of the percentage of cases settled 
through guilty or nolo contendere pleas range as high as 95%. 
9 Cum.L. Rev. i (1978). 
The willingnes·s of defendants to plead guilty is not 
premised on a desire to unclog courts, but to bargain directly 
for the sentence imposed, and thus avoid the uncertainties o~ 
a trial result. 
The defendant who enters a plea bargain with 
the state offers his consent to judgment in exchange 
for a substantially lighter sentence than he would 
have received had he been convicted after trial. This 
sentence discount for defendants willing to plead 
guilty is common knowledge among lawyers. It has 
been a fact of the American system of criminal 
justice for at least half a century, and has recently 
received the imprimatur of the United States Supreme 
Court. 
7 Linc. L. Rev. 138 (1972), citing Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-753 (1970); Parker v. N.C., 
397 U.S. 790, 795 (1970). 
The arguments for upholding the plea bargaining system, 
based both on its utility to the courts and the equitable 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fairness of allowing defendants to rely on bargains made 
result in recognition for the process by legal organization. 
Thus the American Bar Association has declared: 
If the plea agreement contemplates the granting 
of charge or sentence concessions by the trial judge, 
he should . permit withdrawal of the plea (or, 
if it has not yet been accepted, withdrawal of the 
tender of the plea) in any case in which the judge 
determines not to grant charge or sentence concessions. 
ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial 
Judge, (Approved Draft) , § 4. 1. 
The official conunentary to this section recommends 
mandating that the defendant be given the opportunity to 
withdraw his plea regardless· of the advance statements of the 
judge concerning his concurrence, reasoning that there is 
always· "at least the taint of false inducement." 
The American Bar Association stance is echoed by 
the American Law Institute: 
If, at the time of sentencing, the court for 
any reason determines to impose a sentence more 
severe than that provided for in the plea agreement 
between the parties, the ·court shall inf onn the 
defendant of the fact and shall inform the defendant 
that the court will entertain a motion to withdraw 
the plea. 
American Law Institutes's Model Code of Pre-arraignment 
Procedure, § 350.6. 
B. JUDICIAL ABUSE IN THE PRESENT CASE 
At the time of trial the withdrawal of a guilty plea in 
Utah was controlled by § 77-24-3, Utah Code Annotated, (1953). 
This section permitted, prior to judgment, the plea to be with-
drawn. Numerous cases by the Utah Supreme Court construed that 
-7-
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statute not to vest any absolute right in the accused, but 
rather to give the trial judge a discretionary power. None-
theless-, the court has stated that it would interfere to set 
aside a sentence whenever defendant can prove an abuse in 
the failure to exercise that discretionary power. State v. 
Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337,339 (Utah 1977); State v. Soper, 559 
P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 1977). The present case is a clear example 
of such abuse. 
(_Section 77-24-3 has been replaced in the new Code 
of Criminal Procedure 1 effective July 1, 1980, by Section 77-13-6. 
The new section also permits the withdrawal of a guilty plea 
prior to conviction with good cause and leave of court.) 
An increasing number of jurisdictions, as exempli-
fied by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
are liberalizing the right of defendants to withdraw guilty 
pleas whether before or after sentencing. This recognition 
may come through legislative or judicial action. See e.q. 
State v. Theurer, 118 N.J. Super.485, 288 A.2d 587 (1972), 
rev'd 62 N.J. 64, 298 A.2d (1972); People v. Delles, 873 Cal. 
Rept. 389, 447 P.2d 629, 632 (1968), providing: 
If a defendant pleads guilty as part of a bargain 
with an apparently authoritative and relaible public 
official -- usually the prosecutor or, as here, the 
trial judge himself -- whereby he is assured of re-
ceiving in return for his plea probation, a lenient 
sentence, or some other form of special consideration, 
the trial judge may not impose judgment contrary to 
the terms of such bargain without affording the 
defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea 
either by a motion under Penal Code, section 1018 
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before judgment (People v. Griggs, 17 Cal.2d, 
621, 110 P.2d 1031) or by a motion to vacate 
judgment or a petition in the nature of coram 
nobia after judgment (People v. Wadkins, 63 Cal.2d 
110, 45 Cal. Rptr. 173, 403 P.2d 429). (Emphasis 
added.) 
This trend, granting greater protection to the 
accused's constitutional rights, is merely an extension of 
the practice, acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court, that 
plea withdrawal is occasionally necessary to prevent a 
manifest injustice, therefore it is judicial abuse to deny 
the motion to withdraw. See State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 
378 P.2d 671, 673 (1963); ABA Standards, supra. The denial 
of the withdrawal by the trial judge violated clearly 
defined Utah standards. It should have been withdrawn 
pursuant to Utah and United States Supreme Court standards. 
Santobello, supra, ~· 261; State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 
453 (Utah 1978); State v. Olafson, 567 P.2d 156, 158 
(Utah 1977), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); 
State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah 1976). Despite 
the court having inquired as to the defendant's state of 
mind and knowledge of the freedom of the court to act, the 
circumstances under which the plea was entered indicate 
that is was in reliance on medical evidence not supporting 
incarceration as it would accomplish no purpose in treatment 
or rehabilitation of the appellant in the prison facilities 
as they presently exist. The present plea should be declared 
to be involuntary because it was made in belief that credence 
-9-
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would be given the unanimous medical reports and a possible 
meritorious culpability defense was dropped in reliance 
thereon. Defendant has been victimized if this Court 
declares that after he entered freely into a system where 
both sides negotiate, enter agreements, and more promises, 
his plea and decision to drop a defense were voluntary even 
when his anticipations are frustrated. Although the court 
may flatly state that the only promise was a recommend of 
leniency, the logic and result defy the definition of 
"voluntary". 
In this regard it should be noted that generally, 
motions to withdraw guilty pleas are more liberally granted 
when a potentially meritorious defense has been abandoned in 
favor of a disregarded bargain. See 66 A.L.R. 3d 896, 943 
(1975); 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law ~ 505. Considerting the 
overwhelming, unanimous agreement of three psychiatrists 
and one Ph.D. in psychology that defendant did not mean to 
injure or cause death as indicated by his attempt to give 
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation (see psychiatric evaluation of 
Dr. Crist): that the death of the daughter was accidental 
and that defendant has positive characteristics that can 
be used with help of supportive psychotherapy (see Summary 
and Recommendation, Psychological Assessment of Douglas K. 
Gottfredson, Ph.D.); and that he "lacked substantial capacity" 
and that ''it is my ultimate conclusion that his needs and 
the needs of society would best be served if he were shifted 
-10-
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from the criminal justice system to the mental health system 
with compassion for his background" (Report of Eugene J. Faux, M.D. 
F.A.P.A.), it seems irrefutable that defendant gave up an arguably 
valid insanity defense. 
Yet respondents would argue that the subjective opinion 
of one judge, contrary to all principles, skills and knowledge 
used in sociology, psychology, psychiatry, criminology, and 
generic social work, is not an abuse. By denying the attempt 
to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial judge has not only defeated 
the policy reasons behind plea bargaining, he has abused the 
constitutional rights of this particular defendant. Defendant 
entered into good faith bargaining with the prosecution after 
which he voluntarily and knowingly pleaded guilty. He is not 
presently asking this Court for clemency for his action, but 
merely a return to status quo ante. Defendant seeks the right 
to proceed to his constitutionally guaranteed right to trial. 
Further, the psychiatric findings of marginal I.Q., 
profound grief, mental defect, compel compassion and preclude a 
holding that the plea was totally "voluntary and intelligent". If 
the possibility exists that defendant's actions did not meet the 
standards of criminal responsibility, the possibility also exists 
that defendant could not make a rational plea believing that all 
medical evidence would be disregarded. The trial judge abused 
his power by failing to allow the withdrawal of the plea based 
on his own personal feelings of the guilt of the accused by the 
nature of the crime and facts. See State v. Triplett, 96 Ariz. 
199 I 393 p • 2d, 666 (1964) • 
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Th_e survival of th.e cons.ti tutional right to trial 
Iias been noted in the United States Supreme Court and acknow-
ledged by the. Supreme Court of Utah. 
The right to a jury trial is constitutionally 
guaranteed but it may be waived, and when no 
issue is raised as to innocence, there is nothing 
to try. Once a plea of guilty is knowingly and 
voluntarily entered, there are no issues for trial. 
State v. Yeck, 556 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977). 
This fact of constitutional protection of the right 
to trial, as well as it's application in the plea withdrawal 
context, was noted by Justice Marshall in a partly concurring 
opinion in Santobello, joined by Justice Brennan and Steward: 
There is no need to belabor the fact that the 
Constitution guarantees to all criminal defendants 
the right to a trial by judge or jury, or, put 
another way, the "right not to plead guilty," United 
States v. Jackson, 390 US 570, 581, 20 L Ed 2d 138, 
145, 88 S Ct 1209 (1968). This and other federal 
rights may be waived through a guilty plea, but 
such waivers are not lightly presumed and, in fact, 
are viewed with the "utmost solicitude". Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 US 238, 243, 23 L Ed 2d 274, 279, 89 
S Ct 1790 (1969}. Given this, I believe that where 
the defendant presents a reason for vacating his 
plea and the government has not relied on the plea 
to its disadvantage, the plea may be vacated and the 
right to trial regained, at least where the motion 
to vacate is made prior to sentence and judgment. 
In other words, in such circumstances I would not 
deem the earlier plea to have irrevocably waived the 
defendant's federal constitutional right to a trial. 
Here, petitioner never claimed any automatic 
right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing. 
Rather, he tendered a specific reason why, in his 
case, the plea should be vacated. (Emphasis added.) 
Santobello, Supra, at 267. 
-12-
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No Utah case seems on point in deciding the present 
issue. Although several cases hold that the ability to withdraw 
a plea is discretionary, with the trial court, all are dis-
tinguishable. 
Many Utah cases involve the attempt to withdraw the 
guilty plea after sentencing, rather than before as present. 
See, e.g. State v. Harris, supra; State v. Garfield, supra; 
State v. Plum, supra. Thus after apparently gambling with 
the courts and being dissatisfied with the results, defendants 
were denied a second chance. Here, defendant constantly defened 
his right to his bargained plea and had not lost it through 
apathy or want of diligence, consider Ballard v. State, 
131 Ga. App. 347, 207 SE 2d 246 (1974), in which, although 
pursuant to a mandatory statute, the Georgia Supreme Court 
showed compassion in allowing the withdrawal of a guilty plea 
by liberally construing the time of sentencing. Also note the 
A. L. R. and Am. Jr. cites, ·supra, reconunending generous exercise 
of discretion by the court in instances when the motion is made 
timely, i.e., prior to sentencing. 
Other Utah cases relied on for more compelling reasons 
to deny the motion to withdraw. Thus in Olafson and Yeck, supra, 
express findings of voluntary and intelligent pleas were made. 
In the Forsyth case, supra, the court was unwilling to believe 
unsupported facts, in State v. Larson, 560 P.2d 335 (Utah 1977), 
unwilling to believe self-serving statements. None of these 
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rationales apply at present. 
Finally, in addition to these decisions that compel 
a finding of abuse, the public policy arguments add a con-
vincing voice. 
It is in the public interest to maintain defendant, 
confidence in the plea bargaining process. In fact, the public 
receives a double benefit in the instant case. It is presented 
with smoothly functioning unclogged courts in which defendants 
comfortably bargain for fair and humane treatment, and it allows 
the rehabilitation of a useful member of society. Indeed, the 
pre-sentence report prepared by the Adult Probation and Parole 
Board indicates nothing but potential for defendant. The 
public loses noth~ng when this Court declares that as a matter 
of fundamental fairness. Defendant is entitled to a trial on 
the merits. 
POINT II • 
THE "PANELING" BY THE ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
DEPARTMENT WAS A VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS. 
The trial judge had referred the matter of sentence 
recommendation to the Adult Probation and Parole Department for 
a pre-sentencing report. The result of the department's investigatioi 
as scored on an objective "guideline recornmendaton form" indicated 
that defendant should be released on probation. This recommendation, 
along with the findings in the investigation that the individual 
had mental and emotional problems, a stable employment history, 
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a history as a victim of child abuse as corroborated by a member 
of the Utah Highway Patrol, and the favorable comments of the 
local Justice of the Peace in Roosevlet were overlooked after 
the matter was "paneled" by the department. This procedure 
is of a meeting of department members in which they discuss 
various referrals from the court and then make recommendations. 
In the present case, "paneling" violated defendant's due process 
rights, when over the guidelines they recom..mended incarceration · 
in the Utah State Prison. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
guarantees citizens the right to be present and heard and to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses against them at any hearing 
in which there is a possibility of a serious deprivation of 
liberty. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). "Due 
process of law is an opportunity to be heard and defend a sub-
stanti ve right. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trus·t & s·avings Co. v. Hill, 
281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930). 
. . b , d h , d l' +-' This right to e near las oroa app ica_ion: 
"The due process of law clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not take up the statutes of the several 
States and make them the test of what it requires; 
nor does it enable this Court to revise the decisions 
of the state courts on questions of state law. 
What it does require is that state action, whether 
through one agency or another, shall be consistent 
with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions and not infrequently are designated as 
'law of the la!').d'. Those principles are applicable 
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alike in all the States and do not depend upon 
or vary with local legislation." Hebert v. Louisiana, 
272 us 312, 316, 317. 
"This court has never attempted to define with 
precision the words 'due process of law,' nor is it 
necessary to do so in this case. It is sufficient 
to say that there are certain immutable principles of 
justice which inhere in the very idea of free govern-
ment which no member of the Union may disregard, as 
that no man shall be condemned in his person or 
property without due notice and an opportunity of being 
heard in his defence." Holden v. Hardy, 169 US 366,390. 
Bute v. Illinois,333 US 647, 648 (1947). 
The Supreme Court has also declared that the accused 
has the right to be present at every stage of the trial at which 
his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings. 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). Although the 
paneling was not a function of the trial court proper, it's 
relationship to the whole was such that a denial of representation 
at the hearing frustrated the trial fairness. 
Defendant was entitled to legal counsel at every step 
of the proceedings that may have lead to incarceration. The 
violation of this due process guarantee should result in this 
Court ordering a reversal. 
POIN·T III 
INCARCERATION AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON CONSTITUTES 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
The United States Supreme Court has held the cruel 
and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution applicable to the states by reason 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660 (1962). 
The standards for what constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment have been explicitly laid out by the Federal District 
Court in Utah, relying on United States Supreme Court directives, 
in Clements v. Turner, 364 F. Supp. 270, 278 (D.C. Utah 1973): 
The principal legal test for determining whether 
punishment is cruel and unusual has come to be one 
related to current community standards of decency. 
This test asks whether under all the circumstances 
the punishment in question is" ... of such character 
or consequences as to shock general conscience or to 
be intolerable in fundamental fairness." Lee v. 
Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 ( th Cir. 1965) (see also 
Church v. Hegstron, 416 F.2d 449, 451 [2d Cir. 1969]). 
Underlying the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment is the basic concept 
of "the dignity of man." Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 
86, 100 (1958). The Court added in Trap at 101, 
78 S. Ct. at 598: 
The Amendment must draw it's meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing socity. 
To the above test have been'added two further 
tests set forth by the court in Jordan v. Fitzharris, 
257 F. Supp. 674, at 679 (N .D.Cal. 1966). 
punishment may be cruel and unusual if greatly 
disproportionate to the offense for which it is 
imposed. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 
368 (1910); Robinson v. State of California, 
(370 U.S. 660) at 676, (1962) (concurring opinion 
of Douglas J. ) ; Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 
890 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Goldberg, J.). 
Finally, a punishment may be cruel and unusual when, 
although applied in pursuit of a legitimate penal 
aim, it goes beyond what is necessary to achieve 
that aim; that is, when a punishment is unnecessarily 
cruel in view of the purpose for which it is used. 
Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S. at 370, 
30 S.Ct. 544; Robinson v. California, supra, 370 U.S. 
at 677, (concurring opinion of Douglas, J.); 
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Rudolph v~ Alabama, supra (375 U.S.) at 891, 
84 S. Ct. at 155 (dissenting opinion of Goldberg, 
J. ) . 
Considering the totality of all factors, the 
accused's history as a child abuse victim, his stability 
and value to the general community despite his mental defects 
and psychological problems, and the overwhelming possibility 
of successful rehabilitative therapy as expressed by all 
examining physicians, including appointed alienists, appointed 
by the court, the decision to imprison defendant cannot be 
said to meet the above standards, although sanctions against 
defendant may ultimately be desirable to ensure that he 
continues to conform to society's norms. Incarceration not 
only "goes beyond that legitimate penal aim," it is counter-
productive to it. It is cruel and unusual punishment to lock 
defendant away from the ~upport systems capable of rehabilitating 
him in the circumstances of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests this Court to determine 
incarceration under the reasoning of the trial court is 
cruel and inhuman punishment, it being more logical to 
impose a sanction of obtaining required treatment or be 
incarcerated for failure to obtain treatment as the medical 
evidence does not support incarceration for the act for 
which there is evidence that the defendant committed, his 
mental responsibility and knowledge and intent being questionable. 
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In the alternative, appellant seeks a finding by this Court 
that the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to 
permit the withdrawal of his voluntary plea of guilty prior 
to sentencing and to permit him to be tried on the original 
charge of second degree murder. 
------
19 80. 
Respectfully submitted this 2 ~ day of August, 
Robert{ M. McRae 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Defendant/appellant 
319 West First South, Suite A 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed, postage 
prepaid, a copy of the foregoing to Robert B. Hansen, Attorney 
General ®f Utah, Attorney for Respondent, 236 Utah State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on thisL..--~day of August, 1980. 
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